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A two-country, comparative static partial equilibrium model is used to simulate the ex 
ante market and welfare outcomes of U.S. country-of-origin labeling for the U.S.-Mexico 
fresh tomato trade. In all scenarios where consumers show a relative preference for U.S. 
tomatoes, Mexican tomato exports decline and U.S. production increases. Mexican trade 
losses using low- to mid-range consumer preference assumptions are 14% to 32% of the 
value of Mexican tomato exports to the United States and 1% to 3% of the total value of 
agricultural produce exports, partially negating the market access gains of NAFTA. 
Consumer effects are small and sometimes negative. Producer impact is the big effect, 
with transfer from Mexican to U.S. tomato producers. 
 





Information on a product’s country of origin influences consumer behavior in a complex 
manner. Researchers do not agree on the magnitude of the “country-of-origin” effect, but 
there is general agreement that it differs by product (Verlegh and Steenkamp, 1999) and 
country (Ehmke, 2006). Since the early 1990s, countries are increasingly requiring retail 
outlets to identify country of origin by labeling a large variety of agricultural commodities 
and food products (Josling, Roberts, and Orden, 2004). In the United States, the 2002 and 
2008 Farm Bills amended the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 to require retailers to notify 
consumers of the country of origin for beef, lamb, pork, fish, poultry, goat, perishable 
agricultural commodities, macadamia nuts, pecans, peanuts, and ginseng. The country-of-
origin labeling (COOL) requirement was implemented for seafood in 2005, and for other 
covered products in 2009. 
  The magnitude of the benefits and costs of COOL implementation, and their incidence, are 
contentious. The U.S. regulation states: “The intent of this law is to provide consumers with 
additional information on which to base their purchasing decisions” [U.S. Department of 
Agriculture/Agricultural Marketing Service (USDA/AMS), 2003, p. 61945]. Proponents argue 
that society values information that allows consumers to make purchase decisions regarding 
the origin of their food, regardless of the underlying motivation behind these choices. 
Congress characterizes the labeling regime as a marketing tool for farmers and ranchers 
across the nation.
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may eventually lead to retailers removing products from supermarket shelves, inadvertently 
reducing consumer options (Carter and Zwane, 2003; USDA/AMS, 2003). Internationally, 
trade partners describe COOL as protectionist and argue that the regulation is noncompliant 
with U.S. commitments under the Uruguay Round Agreement and North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1999). 
  We use a two-country, comparative static partial equilibrium model to assess the ex ante 
market and welfare outcomes of the U.S. COOL regime on U.S.-Mexico tomato trade. Fresh 
tomatoes from Mexico have been the number one horticultural import product to the United 
States since the early 1990s (Grant, Lambert, and Foster, 2010), and U.S.-Mexico tomato 
trade has historically been the subject of a series of trade disputes (Bredahl, Schmitz, and 
Hillman, 1997). Only a few studies have estimated the effects of COOL on U.S. trade and its 
trading partners (Peel, 2003; Rude, Javis, and Brewin, 2006). In contrast with much of the 
existing literature on COOL, our analysis addresses consumer information benefits as well as 
Mexican and U.S. producer costs in order to evaluate the overall economic impact of the 
regulation. 
 
Overview of U.S.-Mexican Tomato Trade 
 
Imports of Mexican fresh tomatoes to the United States have been a source of contention 
since the prohibition of tomato imports from Cuba in the early 1960s. As a result of the 
discontinuation of the Cuban supply, both the Florida and Northwest Mexican (Sinaloa) 
growers rapidly boosted production in order to expand their winter seasonal market shares 
(Thompson and Wilson, 1997). The first significant U.S.-Mexico tomato trade conflict 
surfaced during the 1968–69 marketing years when the Florida Marketing Trade Committee 
proposed legislation to set larger size requirements for vine-ripe tomatoes than mature green 
tomatoes. This legislation reduced the supply of largely Mexican-produced vine-ripe 
tomatoes, increasing demand for the primarily Florida-produced mature green tomatoes. A 
court order initiated by Arizona-based importers in 1975 eventually overturned this 
legislation (Thompson and Wilson, 1997; Bredahl, Schmitz, and Hillman, 1997). 
  Following the court injunction, Florida producer groups lobbied for mandatory retail-level 
country-of-origin labeling on fresh tomatoes and import price triggers to support domestic 
tomato prices year-round. After these initial attempts failed, and despite Mexico’s estab-
lishment of voluntary export quotas, a coalition of Florida producer groups initiated an anti-
dumping complaint with the Department of Commerce in 1978, claiming Mexico was selling 
produce at below the fair market value during the winter months. During the period of the 
anti-dumping dispute, Florida producer groups were able to garner support for a state-level 
mandatory country-of-origin labeling program for fresh produce that became effective in 
1979. A 1984 ruling determined that Mexican producers were not dumping produce in the 
United States (Thompson and Wilson, 1997; Bredahl, Schmitz, and Hillman, 1997). 
  In the early 1990s, NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) 
appeared to signal a breakthrough for Mexican producers trying to gain increased access to 
the U.S. domestic market. Under NAFTA, the United States gradually phased out its summer 
seasonal tariffs for fresh Mexican tomatoes over a four-year period ending in 1998, and 
through the use of a tariff rate quota also gradually reduced winter month tariff measures over 
a nine-year period ending in 2003. Under the URAA, U.S. tariffs on all imported tomatoes 
were also phased out by 2000.   Johnecheck, Wilde, and Caswell  COOL and U.S.-Mexican Tomato Trade   505 
 
  However, tomato trade disputes began to resurface between the two countries in 1996, 
when the Florida tomato industry accused Mexico of selling tomatoes at below fair market 
value prices, and the U.S. Department of Commerce again initiated an anti-dumping 
investigation against Mexico. The investigation was suspended later in 1996, and Mexican 
producers agreed to a reference price floor. The suspension agreement was revisited in 2002, 
setting separate floor prices for the summer and winter seasons. The voluntary export restraint 
agreement was again signed in 2008 (USDA/AMS, 2008). 
  Between 1993, when NAFTA took effect, and 2000, Mexican tomato imports grew by 
47% [USDA/Economic Research Service (ERS), 2002].
2 Imports accounted for one-third of 
U.S. tomato consumption in 2003, with Mexico making up 81% of this trade (USDA/ERS, 
2004). Mexican imports continued to increase through 2007, despite the anti-dumping sus-
pension agreement; during the post-NAFTA period (1993 to 2007), fresh tomatoes averaged 
11% of the value of Mexican agricultural exports to the United States (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2008). 
  Thompson and Wilson (1997) found that grower-shipper arrangements dominate the early 
stages of the production supply chain in the North American fresh tomato market. Grower-
shipper firms in California, Florida, Sinaloa (Northwest Mexico), and Mexico’s Baja Cali-
fornia vie for market share during different times of the year. Florida and Sinaloa producers 
supply the U.S. market with tomatoes during the late fall, winter, and spring seasons, while 
California, Mexico’s Baja California, and U.S. regional producers compete for demand during 
the late spring and summer months. Grower-shippers are increasingly extending their market 
season by purchasing or leasing land or contracting with local producers in regions with a 
different growing season. Some of these vertically integrated companies have production 
occurring in both the United States and Mexico. 
 
A Model of Quality Differentiation by Country of Origin 
A growing number of researchers have adapted Mussa and Rosen’s (1978) vertical product 
differentiation framework to evaluate the market and welfare effects of a label supplying 
information about a credence quality attribute to consumers. Examples include hormone-
treated beef (Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina, 1998), eco-labels (Nimon and Beghin, 1999), 
genetically modified crops (Fulton and Giannakas, 2004; Giannakas and Fulton, 2001), and 
indications of source (Zago and Pick, 2004; Awada and Yiannaka, 2006; Plastina, 2007). The 
analytical framework and empirical work conducted in this paper draw upon this well-
developed thread of earlier research. 
  The model utilizes linear supply and demand function intercepts and slopes to estimate 
changes in market and welfare equilibria resulting from COOL. It differs from other frame-
works used to estimate the market and welfare impacts of COOL (see, for example, work 
using equilibrium displacement models by Lusk and Anderson, 2004; Brester, Marsh, and 
Atwood, 2004; and Chung, Zhang, and Peel, 2004) in that it derives post-COOL differen-
tiated demand curves from a single pre-COOL nonlabeled demand function. This feature of 
the framework is closely linked to the intent of our research, which focuses on estimating the 
impact of consumer perception regarding the origin quality of tomatoes on trade with Mexico.
                                                 
2 This same USDA/ERS (2002) analysis predicted that NAFTA tariff changes led to an 8% to 15% increase in imports over what 
would have occurred from URAA commitments. The increase in export volumes was not just a result of reduced tariffs; additional 
factors were Mexican peso devaluation, new seed varieties lengthening the shelf life of tomatoes, and increased tomato consump-
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  Supply and demand parameters representing the pre- and post-COOL states of the regulation 
are denoted by the subscripts n (nonlabeled pre-COOL) and l (labeled post-COOL). Subscripts 
u and m represent the U.S. and Mexican markets, respectively. 
 
Pre- and Post-COOL Consumer Demand 
 
In the pre-COOL scenario, consumers cannot distinguish between the two types of tomatoes 
because they do not have any origin information. In the post-COOL environment, a label 
allows consumers to purchase according to their individual preferences for the two qualities 
(yielding differentiated demand curves). The pre- and post-COOL inverse demand functions 
describe prices (p) as a function of quantities (q). The parameter μ
0 is an intercept, the slope 
is negative, and the parameter µ
1 is the absolute value of the slope: 
(1) 
01 () , j jj j j pq q    
where j is either n (nonlabeled), lm (Mexican), or lu (United States). 
  In the pre-COOL setting, we assume the slope parameter for nonlabeled tomatoes is a 
weighted average of the corresponding slope parameters describing consumer preferences for 
labeled U.S. and Mexican tomatoes. The weights are the quantity shares of U.S. and Mexican 
tomatoes on the market in the unlabeled state.
3 The model assumes the parameter 
1
lm   is 
largest, because the price must be lowered most steeply to convince consumers to purchase an 
additional marginal unit of Mexican tomatoes. Hence, 
11 1 . lm n lu     
  A structural model of utility maximization put forward by Giannakas and Fulton (2001) 
and Plastina (2007) is useful for stating the relationships among the demand function param-
eters more precisely. Suppose consumers vary in the utility they gain from consumption of 
Mexican and U.S. tomatoes or from consumption of a nonlabeled tomato that consumers treat 
as a weighted mixture of Mexican and U.S. tomatoes. The net utility takes the following 
form: 
(2) 
1 , j jj UU c p    
where j is either n, lm, or lu. The constant U is a base level of utility with no tomato purchase. 
The characteristic c reflects heterogeneous consumer preferences for the origin quality of 
tomatoes, where c is uniformly distributed from 0 to C in the population. U.S. consumers with 
a low c value have a weak preference for domestic products, and those with a high c value 
have a strong preference for domestic products. 
  In the unlabeled pre-COOL scenario, a consumer making a marginal expenditure must 
choose between two options: purchasing a nonlabeled tomato or purchasing something else. 
For a consumer who does purchase a tomato, equation (2) shows that Uj falls as pj rises, 
because the tomato is more expensive. The option of purchasing something else offers utility 
denoted  0. n U   One may think of the parameter  0
n   as the price above which no consumer 
will choose tomatoes.
4 The consumer chooses whichever option offers the highest utility. 
                                                 
3 Specifically, the model assumes that both post-COOL inverse demand slopes are a function of the pre-COOL inverse demand 
slope 
1, n   the quantity shares of Mexican and U.S. tomatoes in the market, and the relative degree of preference for U.S. tomatoes 
111 [( ) / ] lm lu lu     (Plastina, 2007). 
4 Giannakas and Fulton (2001) and Plastina (2007) describe this parameter as the price of a substitute product. Johnecheck, Wilde, and Caswell  COOL and U.S.-Mexican Tomato Trade   507 
 
  Figure 1 shows pre-COOL consumer utility as a function of c. For each value of c, either 
tomato purchase or nonpurchase offers the highest utility. For a consumer with c = 0, 
indicating the greatest utility from purchasing a tomato, the vertical intercept is derived from 
equation (2): U
 −
 pn. Because c is uniformly distributed, one can derive the fraction of the 
population that prefers each of the two options. At a threshold value of c*, a marginal consumer 
obtains equal utility from purchasing a nonlabeled tomato or something other than a tomato: 
U 
1 0 * . nn n cpU      This equality can be used to solve for 
01 *. nnn pc    The demand 
for nonlabeled tomatoes qn equals the fraction of the population that chooses to purchase a 
tomato, which equals c* (see figure 1). Hence, the inverse demand curve is given by: 
(3) 
01 , nnn n pq    
which corresponds to equation (1). 
  The pre-COOL consumer surplus measure equals the area under the unlabeled tomato 
utility curve and the “substitute product” utility curve (which corresponds to the area under 
the bold dashed line in figure 1): 
(4) 
02 1 ( ) 2 shaded area. / nn n CS p        
Appendix B provides pre- and post-COOL market equilibria calculations. 
  Figure 2, by contrast, shows the post-COOL utility function as a function of c. Consumers 
now have three options: purchasing a Mexican tomato, purchasing a U.S. tomato, or purchas-
ing something else. Each consumer (with a unique value of c) will choose the option that 
generates the highest utility. Recall that consumers with low values of c have the weakest 
preference for the U.S. product. Consumers with characteristic c  [0, c**] purchase Mexican 
tomatoes, while  consumers with characteristic c   [ c**,  c***] purchase U.S. tomatoes. By 
identifying the consumer who derives the same utility from purchasing either a Mexican or 
U.S. tomato (c**: Ulm = Ulu) and solving for c, one can obtain the taste parameter (c**) for the 
marginal consumer, and the quantity demanded of Mexican tomatoes: 
(5) 
11 ** () () . / lm lu lm lm lu qc pp      
Similarly, by identifying the consumer who derives the same utility from either purchasing a 
domestic tomato or something other than a tomato 
0 *** (: ) , lu n cUU    the quantity demanded 
of U.S. tomatoes can be obtained: 
(6) 
01 1 1 *** ** () ( ) ( ) . / / lu n lu lu lu lm lm lu qc c p pp                
Through substitution, the differentiated inverse demand functions for Mexican and U.S. 
tomatoes, which correspond to equation (1), can be derived as: 
(7) 
01 1
lm n lu lu lm lm pq q        
and 
(8)  
01 1. l u n l ul m l ul u pq q        
  The intercepts in square brackets in equations (7) and (8) show that Mexican and U.S. 
tomatoes are substitutes and that the demand for labeled Mexican tomatoes falls as the equi-
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surplus measure for consumption of U.S. and Mexican tomatoes equals the area under the 
utility functions in figure 2 (the area under the bold dashed line): 
(9)    
21 1 0 2 1 ( ) 2( ) ( ) 2 shaded area. / / lu lm lm lu n lu lu CS p p p                   
 
Pre- and Post-COOL Supply 
 
In both the pre- and post-COOL scenarios, U.S. retailers purchase tomatoes from U.S. and 
Mexican producers, such that some combination of both domestic and Mexican tomatoes make 
up the retail supply available to consumers. The supply-side analytical framework distinguishes 
between the producer and the retailer in order to adequately attribute the costs of record 
keeping, segregation, and labeling to the correct participants within the supply chain. The pro-
ducer analysis includes growers and shippers, while the intermediaries (handlers, importers, 
processors, and wholesalers) are included in the retailer analysis. 
  As part of ensuring origin information throughout the supply chain, the COOL regulation 
requires that any establishment (grower, shipper, re-packer, importer, distributor, or whole-
saler) supplying tomatoes to a retailer, either directly or indirectly, must provide country-of-
origin information for the tomato to the subsequent purchaser of the product. In practice, U.S. 
tomato growers and importers of Mexican tomatoes already keep records that can be used to 
substantiate origin claims. However, this information is not systematically transferred to the 
subsequent purchaser. Therefore, producers and importers will incur costs as a result of 
COOL. Mexican growers are already required to provide origin information as part of standard 
Customs and Border Patrol marking regulations and will not face increased per unit costs of 
production. 
  Tomato re-packers and distributors are expected to bear a significant portion of the costs 
associated with implementing COOL legislation as they will be required to attain producer 
origin records, maintain identity of the tomato throughout the handling stages, and pass on 
this information through records or by pre-labeling or packaging the product. The retailer must 
also maintain origin records and provide country-of-origin information either by individually 
labeling a tomato or using a bulk container (i.e., display case, carton, shipper bin, etc.) to 
relay country of origin to the consumer (USDA/AMS, 2008, p. 45113). 
  Equation (10) represents the pre-COOL linear inverse supply functions at the retail level: 
(10) 
01 , njj j pq    
where j is either nm, nu, or num (combined retail). Figure 3 illustrates price and quantity 
determination in the market for unlabeled tomatoes before the implementation of COOL. The 
retail-level inverse supply function for all producers (Snum) is the horizontal sum of the 
separate inverse supply functions for Mexican producers (Sm) and U.S. producers (Sus). 
Because the tomatoes are unlabeled, the intersection of the supply and demand functions for 
all tomatoes determines the equilibrium market price (pnl) and quantity (qnum). Once pnl is 
determined, the intersection of pnl with the separate U.S. and Mexican supply functions 
determines, respectively, the U.S. supply quantity (qnu) and the Mexican supply quantity 
(qnm). 
  Producer-level inverse supply curves (not shown) mirror those of the retail level except the 




























Figure 4. Post-COOL market and welfare outcomes 




j   can be derived from empirical estimates of the producers’ supply elasticity. For 
an equilibrium quantity and price, equation (10) can be solved for the intercept 
0 () . j 
5 
  By contrast, figure 4 illustrates price and quantity determination in the post-COOL market 
for labeled tomatoes. Because the inverse demand functions now separately represent 
consumer demand for Mexican and U.S. labeled tomatoes, figure 4 is split into two panels 
corresponding to the two sources of tomatoes. The Mexican and U.S. inverse supply 
functions are the same as in figure 3, except that they have been shifted upward to account for 
implementation costs. The intersections of supply and demand for Mexican tomatoes in the 
left panel and U.S. tomatoes in the right panel determine the equilibrium prices (plm and plu) 
and quantities (qlm and qlu). Although the two panels appear separate, close inspection of the 
intercepts of the demand functions shows how they are linked. If the quantity of U.S. 
tomatoes (qlu) increases, then demand for Mexican tomatoes is suppressed, and vice versa. 
The determination of prices and quantities by solving equations (7), (8), and (10) involves 
both markets simultaneously. 
  The post-COOL intercept of the U.S. inverse supply function,
0 , lu  equals
0
nu  plus the addi-
tional grower-level record-keeping costs, and intermediary- and retail-level labeling and market 
segregation costs. The intercept of the Mexican post-COOL supply function,
0 , lm  only adds 
the additional unit costs incurred at the intermediary and retail levels to 
0 . nm   
  In both the pre- and post-COOL environments, the producer surplus is the area above the 
inverse supply function and below the equilibrium price (see figures 3 and 4). In the pre-
COOL state: 
(11) 
0 (1/ 2)( ) , j nj j PSp q    
where j is either nm or nu. Because the intercepts of our supply functions are negative, as 
described above, we adjust the producer surplus from equation (11) by subtracting the region 
of consumer surplus corresponding to negative prices. 
  In the post-COOL state, similar equations are used for producer surplus in Mexico and the 
United States, except that the post-COOL equilibrium prices are different for U.S. and Mexican 
tomatoes, and the supply intercepts are adjusted upward for the additional costs of COOL. 
 
Ex Ante Market and Welfare Outcomes of U.S. COOL 
We simulated the change in market and welfare outcomes for U.S.-Mexican tomato trade due 
to COOL implementation.
6 For robustness, the simulations used multiple values for key 
parameters: (a) relative preference for U.S. tomatoes, (b) labeling and record-keeping costs, 
(c) elasticity of demand, and (d) elasticity of supply. (Appendix A provides a description of 
the data used for calibrating the simulation model.) 
 
Relative Preference for U.S. Tomatoes 
We used four levels of consumer preference for U.S. tomatoes  11 1 [( ) / ]: mu s u s    high, med-
ium, low, and no preference. The high preference value of 60% is based on Mabiso et al. (2005),
                                                 
5 With empirical short-run supply elasticity estimates, this intercept is negative. It has no literal interpretation as a reservation 
price. Instead, the inverse supply function is considered a linear approximation that is tolerably accurate in the neighborhood of the 
equilibrium. 
6 For the purposes of this study, fresh tomatoes include round, roma (plum), greenhouse (hothouse), cherry tomatoes, and small 
quantities of other varieties. 512   December 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
who found that consumers on average are willing to pay a 93 cent per pound (60%) premium 
for tomatoes labeled “USA grown” when they know that the nonlabeled alternative is 
Mexican tomatoes.
7 The no preference value of 0% reflects the USDA/AMS assumption of 
no preference, and therefore no benefit to consumers. Because hypothetical willingness-to-
pay studies are sometimes thought to overstate real-world price differentials, we prefer 
medium preference (30%) and low preference (10%) as intermediate values. 
 
Labeling and Record-Keeping Costs 
 
We used two cost estimates. At the grower level, the low cost estimate comes from the 
USDA/AMS (2003) low range estimate ($10 per ton) for U.S. grower record-keeping costs. 
The high cost estimate is based on the Sparks Companies, Inc. (2003) calculation of $70/ton. 
Although this amount exceeded the 2003 USDA/AMS high range estimate, we used it in 
order to test a full range of possible cost outcomes. At the intermediary/retailer level, the low 
cost ($9.70 per ton) and high cost ($40 per ton) estimates are taken from USDA/AMS. Our 
empirical estimates include multiple scenarios with both high cost and low cost estimates, 
but, for conciseness, our most detailed estimates of quantity changes focus on the high cost 
estimates. 
 
Elasticity of Demand 
 
The low estimate for own-price elasticity of demand (η = −0.32) is based on analysis that 
used U.S. retail fresh tomato data from the period 1981–2004 (Russo, Green, and Howitt, 
2008). The high estimate (η = −1.15) is based on 1999 retail data from six U.S. urban loca-
tions (Thompson, 2003). Because of our prior expectation that short-run demand elasticities 
would be inelastic, our preferred estimates are the low estimates. 
 
Elasticity of Supply 
 
The low short-run price elasticity of U.S. and Mexican tomato supply comes from a study that 
calculated elasticities of supply using data from 1974–1993 (εus = 0.07, εm = 0.19) (Malaga, 
Williams, and Fuller, 2000). The high price elasticity of U.S. tomato supply (εus = 0.27) 
comes from a paper calculating the short-run elasticity of supply for California fresh tomatoes 
using data from 1987–2002 (Russo, Green, and Howitt, 2008). Unfortunately, the latter paper 
had no corresponding estimates for Mexican supply. Hence, our high  price elasticity of 
Mexican tomato supply (εm = 0.40) assumed an increase over the low estimate that is similar 
to the relationship in the findings reported by Malaga, Williams, and Fuller (2000). We prefer 
the high price elasticity of supply estimates because they are based on relatively more current 
data. 
  In our results section, we present outcomes for the medium and low consumer preference 
scenarios in table format and then discuss these results in the text. For the high and no 
preference scenarios, the results are only briefly described in the text. Under the medium and 
low preference assumptions, we report results for both high and low assumptions about costs, 
demand elasticities, and supply elasticities. However, for tractability, we do not include all 
                                                 
7 In contrast, the same study revealed that U.S. consumers were willing to pay a $US 0.38/lb. premium for “USA grown” 
tomatoes over Canadian tomatoes (Mabiso et al., 2005). Johnecheck, Wilde, and Caswell  COOL and U.S.-Mexican Tomato Trade   513 
 
possible combinations of these parameter assumptions, which would require reporting 32 sets 
of results. Instead, we present a greater number of scenarios with the preferred low demand 
elasticity scenarios and high supply elasticity scenarios. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 shows simulation results for the change in market and welfare outcomes for the U.S.-
Mexican tomato trade due to COOL implementation. The first four columns of results assume 
a medium preference for U.S. tomatoes and the last four columns assume a low preference for 
U.S. tomatoes. The high preference results (not shown) mirror those for medium preference 
outcomes, except they are approximately 1.5 to 2 times higher in magnitude. The results of 
the no preference scenario (not shown) are similar to those for low preference, with some-
what smaller magnitudes. The total welfare effect (i.e., Mexican producer welfare plus U.S. 
total producer and consumer welfare combined) is negative in all no preference results, 
because in these scenarios COOL imposes additional costs without providing any consumer 
benefits. 
  Under the four medium  preference  scenarios, Mexican producers fare poorly and U.S. 
producers fare well. COOL would lead to a 4% to 16% decrease in Mexican exports to the 
United States, a lower Mexican tomato equilibrium retail price, and a lower farm-gate price 
paid to Mexican grower-shippers. The welfare losses for Mexican tomato supply chain 
participants are 7% to 28%. The Mexican tomato share in the U.S. market declines by 6% to 
20%. COOL would lead to a higher U.S. tomato quantity sold, retail price, and farm-gate 
price. The U.S. share of the tomato market would grow by 3% to 10%. The increase in producer 
welfare for U.S. supply chain participants ranges from 12% to 32%, with the high outcomes 
associated with scenarios of inelastic demand and relatively more elastic Mexican and U.S. 
supply. The U.S. consumer welfare increases much less, and, in two scenarios, actually 
decreases. Thus, the predominant welfare effects under the medium preference scenarios are a 
transfer of welfare from Mexican to U.S. producers and, in some cases, from U.S. consumers 
to U.S. producers. 
  Under the four low preference scenarios, all quantity, price, and welfare changes are much 
smaller. The total quantity of tomatoes consumed increases by 1% or less. Still, under all 
scenarios, Mexican producers suffer a change in welfare from −3% to −13%, while U.S. 
producer welfare increases by 4% to 12%. Change in U.S. consumer welfare is negative by 
less than 1% under all scenarios except when cost estimates are low, demand is inelastic, and 
supply estimates are elastic, in which case U.S. consumer welfare increases by less than 1%. 
Under all low preference scenarios, COOL leads to small increases in U.S. total welfare 
(producers and consumers combined) and in total welfare of 1% to 2%. Again, the welfare 
results are dominated by a shift of producer welfare from Mexican to U.S. growers. 
  In summary, the simulation reveals that the quantity of Mexican tomato exports declines 
and the quantity of U.S. tomatoes increases in all scenarios in which consumers show a 
relative preference for U.S. over Mexican tomatoes. Under these same assumptions, Mexican 
producer welfare decreases while U.S. producer welfare increases. Change in consumer 
welfare varies across scenarios. COOL leads to positive total welfare effects when consumers 
have a medium preference or high preference for the U.S. version of the product. 
  The primary stated objective of U.S. COOL legislation is to provide valuable information 
to consumers so they may purchase products in line with their preferences. If changes in U.S. 
consumer welfare as defined here provide a measure of the net impact of mandating COOL 514   December 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
Table 1. Market and Welfare Effects of COOL on U.S.-Mexican Tomato Trade 
 
Description 
MEDIUM Relative Preference 
for U.S. Tomatoes 
LOW Relative Preference 
for U.S. Tomatoes 
U.S. Grower Record-Keeping Costs 
(R = $0.10/ton, $0.70/ton) 
High Low Low Low High Low Low Low 
Intermediary/Retailer Labeling Costs 
(L = $9.70/ton, $40.00/ton) 
High Low Low Low High Low Low Low 
Price Elasticity of Demand 
(η = −0.32, −1.15) 
Low High Low Low Low High Low Low 
Price Elasticity of Supply (U.S.) 
(ε = 0.07, 0.27) 
High High High Low High High High Low 
Price Elasticity of Supply (Mexico) 
(ε = 0.19, 0.40) 
High High High Low High High High Low 
  Percentage Change 
U.S. Quantity  14.5  5.7  14.8 5.7  5.2  1.9 5.4 2.0 
Mexican Quantity  −16.3  −3.5  −15.5  −4.4  −7.6  −1.6  −6.7  −1.9 
Total Quantity  4.4  2.6  4.8 2.4  1.0  0.7 1.4 0.7 
U.S. Retail Price  15.7  5.7  14.5  21.4  7.1  2.2  5.7  7.7 
Mexican Retail Price  −7.8  −1.8  −9.3  −5.5  −2.2  −0.6  −3.6  −2.1 
U.S.  Farm-Gate  Price  56.5  21.2 55.4 82.3  22.6  7.2 20.9 29.0 
Mexican Farm-Gate Price  −35.6  −8.3  −37.5  −22.9  −13.4  −3.5  −15.4  −9.2 
Mexican Market Share  −19.8  −6.0  −19.4  −6.7  −8.5  −2.3  −8.0  −2.6 
U.S.  Market  Share  9.7  3.0 9.5 3.3  4.2  1.1 4.0 1.3 
U.S. Consumer Welfare  1.2  −1.4 2.1  −1.9  −0.4  −0.7 0.5  −0.7 
U.S. Producer Welfare  32.0  11.7  32.0  25.3  11.6  3.9  11.4  8.9 
U.S. Total Welfare (Producer & Consumer) 6.4  4.2  7.1  5.5  1.6  1.2  2.3  1.9 
Mexican Producer Welfare  −28.2  −6.7  −28.2  −9.1  −12.6  −3.0  −12.5  −3.7 
Total  Welfare  4.6  2.8 5.2 4.2  0.9  0.7 1.6 1.4 
 
on consumers, then the ex ante simulation results suggest the consumer welfare effect is only 
positive in two out of four cases for high and medium preferences for U.S. over Mexican 
tomatoes, is negative in three out of four cases for low preferences, and negative in all cases 
where there is no preference. In all preference scenarios except no preference, the magnitude 
of percentage increases in U.S. producer welfare and decreases in Mexican producer welfare 
are several times greater than the magnitude of percentage changes in U.S. consumer welfare. 
  Table 2 presents data on the actual change in U.S. and Mexican consumer and farm-gate 
tomato prices, quantities demanded, and the value of production resulting from COOL. These 
results are based on the middle preference estimates of medium and low, the high cost assump- 
tions, the low elasticity of demand estimate, and the high Mexican and U.S. elasticity of 
supply figures. For the Mexican tomato industry, results show that COOL implementation 
with low and medium preferences, respectively, would lead to a $US 105 to 241 million 
decline in value of exports to the United States. These findings were based on the 50,000 and 
106,000 ton decrease in exports occurring in conjunction with a respective $US 0.05/lb. and 
$US 0.14/lb. decrease in export price. The corresponding retail domestic price decrease for 
Mexican tomatoes was $US 0.03/lb. under the low preference scenario and $US 0.12/lb. for the 
medium preference value. Based on 2006 agriculture export data, the combined effect of declines 
in price and exports amounts to between 14% and 32% of the dollar value of Mexican tomatoes Johnecheck, Wilde, and Caswell  COOL and U.S.-Mexican Tomato Trade   515 
 
Table 2. Economic Impact of COOL for Medium and Low Relative Preference for U.S. 
Tomatoes vs. Mexican Tomatoes 
     MEDIUM Relative Preference 
for U.S. vs. Mexican Tomatoes 
LOW Relative Preference 





































Mexican Tomatoes            
  Quantity Consumed
 a ton  (1,000s)  653  547  −106   −16.3   603  −50   −7.7  
  Consumer Price  $US/lb.  1.56  1.44  −0.12   −7.8   1.53  −0.03   −2.1  
  Export Price  $US/lb.  040  0.26  −0.14   −35.6   0.35  −0.05   −13.4  
  Value of Exports
 b $US  (1,000s)  522,706  281,705  −241,001   −46.1   417,879  −104,827   −20.1  
  Market Share  %  33  26  −7   −21.2   30  −3   −9.1  
U.S. Tomatoes              
  Quantity Consumed
 c ton  (1,000s)  1,327  1,520  194  14.6  1,396  69  5.2 
  Consumer Price  $US/lb.  1.56  1.81  0.25  15.7  1.67  0.11  7.1 
  Farm-Gate Price  $US/lb.  0.40  0.63  0.23  56.5  0.49  0.09  22.6 
  Value of Production
 d  $US  (1,000s) 4,147,733 5,409,324 1,351,627  32.6  4,672,412  524,679  12.6 
  Market Share  %  67  74  7  10.4  72  5  7.5 
a Quantity consumed is the 2006 quantity of Mexican fresh tomato exports to U.S. adjusted for home consumption. (Source: U.S. 
Department of Commerce/U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, 2008.) 
b Value of exports is derived from the quantity consumed and export price of Mexican tomatoes. 
c Quantity consumed is the 2006 U.S. fresh tomato production less exports and adjusted for home consumption. (Source: USDA/ 
National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2006.) 
d Value of production is derived from the quantity consumed and consumer price of U.S. tomatoes. 
 
exported to the United States, and 1% to 3% of the dollar value of total agricultural produce 
exported to the United States.
8 
  In contrast, the farm-gate price of U.S. tomatoes increased by $US
 0.09/lb. for the low pref-
erence scenario and $US
 0.23/lb. for the medium preference scenario. Consumption of U.S. 
tomatoes increased between 69,000 to 194,000 tons in the two scenarios. The combined increase 
in price and consumption effects ranged between 8% and 21% of the dollar value of U.S. fresh 
tomato production in 2006.
9 While these findings support claims that COOL will deliver price 
premiums to U.S. tomato supply chain participants, some researchers question whether these 
price gains would be maintained in the long run without some form of supply management 
and ongoing promotion of “U.S.” brand produce (Carter, Krissoff, and Zwane, 2006). 
  Another component of the impact of COOL on U.S. producers is the distribution of benefits 
within the supply chain. Research studies estimating the distribution of COOL costs and benefits
                                                 
8 Statistics are calculated based on the difference in value of Mexican exports resulting from COOL as a percentage of the 2006 
total value of fresh tomato exports and the 2006 total value of Mexican agricultural exports to the United States. The total value of 
2006 Mexican fresh tomato exports ($US 744,596,530) is calculated by multiplying the total quantity of Mexican exports 
(unadjusted for home consumption) (930,746 tons) by the pre-COOL farm-gate export price ($US 800/ton) (U.S. Department of 
Commerce/U.S. Census Bureau, 2008; USDA/National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2006). The value of 2006 Mexican agricul-
tural exports totals $US 9,390,731,000 (U.S. Department of Commerce/U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). 
9 Statistics are calculated based on the difference in value of U.S. fresh tomato production resulting from COOL as a percentage 
of the 2006 total retail value of fresh tomato production. The total retail value of 2006 U.S. fresh tomato production ($US 
6,393,036,000) is calculated by multiplying the total quantity produced (unadjusted for home consumption and exports) (4,098.1 
million lbs.) by the pre-COOL retail price ($US 1.56/lb.) (USDA/National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2006). 516   December 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
along the supply chain have not yielded consistent results. Thus it is unclear whether grower-
shippers or retailers and processors will be the primary beneficiaries of the expected boost in 
U.S. tomato demand. Furthermore, many of the U.S. processors and retailers who market and 
distribute U.S. tomatoes also distribute Mexican tomatoes. A portion of the welfare losses 
associated with the distribution of Mexican tomatoes (the processor and retailer end of the 
supply chain) would also be incurred by the U.S. supply chain, reducing their net welfare 
gains from country-of-origin labeling. 
  Further development of this model, or use of alternative models (such as equilibrium 
displacement models) that better attribute benefits and losses to the respective Mexican and 
U.S. segments of the supply chain, will strengthen impact estimates in the future. Finally, 
U.S.-Mexico fresh tomato trade is bound by seasonal production constraints. If U.S. tomatoes 
are not available on the retail shelf during a given time of year, consumers with a preference 
for domestic tomatoes are forced to make substitution decisions during this time period. To 
the extent that such seasonal supply constraints exist, the results are likely to overstate the 




Tomato trade between the United States and Mexico has been characterized by trade disputes 
as far back as the 1970s, and disagreement remains today. The implementation of COOL will 
likely aggravate these tensions. The simulation results presented here evaluate the economic 
and welfare impacts of U.S. COOL on the Mexican-U.S. tomato trade, taking into consider-
ation several factors that affect them, including the degree to which U.S. consumers prefer 
U.S. over Mexican tomatoes, the record-keeping and labeling costs associated with the 
regulation, and demand and supply price elasticities. Ex ante simulation results employing a 
low to mid-range consumer preference scenario for U.S. over Mexican tomatoes reveal that 
COOL has the potential to reduce the dollar value of Mexican tomato exports to the United 
States by 14% to 32% and total agricultural exports by 1% to 3%. 
  From the perspective of Mexico, COOL partially negates the hard-fought U.S. tomato tariff 
reductions achieved under NAFTA and the URAA. Given Mexico’s relative endowments and 
proximity to the United States, gains from NAFTA were expected for its perishable agri-
cultural sector. While Mexican tomato exports have been a trade success story in the post-
NAFTA period, the projected impacts of COOL suggest an erosion of the potential gains on 
which the agreement was predicated. 
  The results also suggest that changes in consumer welfare as a result of COOL imple-
mentation in this market are only sometimes positive at high, medium, and low preferences 
for U.S. over Mexican tomatoes and often negative, particularly when preferences are 
low or zero. The magnitude of these changes in consumer welfare is, in any case, relatively 
small compared to the magnitude of increases in U.S. and decreases in Mexican producer 
welfare. 
  Additionally, these simulation findings highlight a tension between food-related consumer 
information policies that may enhance domestic (consumer and producer) welfare, while 
simultaneously causing deleterious economic effects on producers in countries that are close 
trading partners. Such scenarios have important implications for domestic-level regulatory 
decision-making structures currently used to evaluate these regulations. Estimates of the 
benefits of providing consumers with information have not been systematically incorporated Johnecheck, Wilde, and Caswell  COOL and U.S.-Mexican Tomato Trade   517 
 
into formal regulatory impact analysis by U.S. agencies for labeling policies.
10 The standard 
economic approach to valuation of information provision would be to ascertain the amount 
consumers are willing to pay for products with the labeling information. However, the USDA/ 
AMS Regulatory Impact Analysis conducted as part of the rule-making process asserted that 
such methods did not adequately capture potential benefits from COOL (2008, p. 45128), and 
subsequently estimated consumer benefits as nonexistent. As consumers increasingly demand 
information about food attributes, and government may progressively play a larger role in 
information provision policies, developing consensus on the appropriate techniques to measure 
the ex ante benefit from providing consumers with information is important. 
  Finally, the projected negative impact of COOL on Mexico makes a strong case for 
broadening the impact analysis of regulations to include effects on trading partners and for 
policy makers to consider these welfare effects in the process of negotiating future trade 
agreements. In the U.S. context, this would require that the cost-benefit analysis for new regu-
lations include assessment of impact on potentially affected countries as part of the net total 
welfare estimate. At the very least, more assessment is needed as to whether a regulation 
would undermine previously negotiated market access commitments. 
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Appendix A: 
Data Used for Calibrating Simulation Model 
 





  Use in Empirical Model 
 





εus and εm  Short-run elasticity of supply 
for U.S. and Mexican fresh 
tomatoes (low estimate) 
Estimate of calculated elasticities 
of supply using price and quantity 
data from 1974–1993. 
εus = 0.07; 
εm = 0.19
  
Malaga, Williams, and 
Fuller (2000) 
εus and εm  Short-run elasticity of supply 
for U.S. and Mexican fresh 
tomatoes (high estimate) 
Calculated using price and 
production data from 1987–2002 
for California fresh tomatoes for 
U.S. supply. For the 
corresponding high estimate of 
short-run elasticity of supply for 
Mexican tomatoes, we assume 
Mexican short-run elasticity of 
supply is relatively higher than 
the U.S. value based on the 
findings of Malaga, Williams, and 
Fuller (2000). 
εus = 0.27; 
εm = 0.40
  
Russo, Green, and 
Howitt (2008) 
η n Own-price  elasticity  of 
demand for unlabeled tomatoes 
in the pre-COOL scenario (low 
estimate) 
Calculated using retail fresh 
tomato data from the time period 
of 1981–2004. 
−0.32   Russo, Green, and 
Howitt (2008) 
η n Own-price  elasticity  of 
demand for unlabeled tomatoes 
in the pre-COOL scenario 
(high estimate) 
Average of uncompensated price 
elasticities of demand for fresh 
round tomatoes in six U.S. 
locations using 1999 data 
(excludes greenhouse, on-the-
vine, roma, and cherry tomatoes). 
−1.15   Thompson (2003, see 
table 5) 
eq
nm q   Equilibrium quantity of 
Mexican tomato consumption 
in the pre-COOL scenario 
Fresh tomato imports from 
Mexico (2006) adjusted to 
account for percentage (70.2%) 




U.S. Department of 
Commerce/U.S. Census 
Bureau, Foreign Trade 
Statistics (2008); 
 
Continuing Survey of 
Food Intakes by 
Individuals (CSFII) 




Equilibrium quantity of U.S. 
tomato consumption in the pre-
COOL scenario 
U.S. production for fresh 
tomatoes (2006) less exports of 
fresh tomatoes (2006). Adjusted 
to account for percentage of 
tomatoes for at-home 






Service (2006) and U.S. 
Department of 
Commerce/U.S. Census 
Bureau, Foreign Trade 
Statistics (2008) 
 
Continuing Survey of 
Food Intakes by 
Individuals (CSFII) 
(Lucier et al., 2000) 
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    Use in Empirical Model 
 




Source   
eq
n q   Total U.S. and Mexican tomato 
consumption in the pre-COOL 
scenario 
eq eq




n p   Equilibrium price for non-
labeled tomatoes in pre-COOL 
scenario 
12-month average retail price 
(2006) of field-grown fresh 
tomatoes adjusted 10% to 
account for waste and spoilage 




U.S. Department of 






See Lucier and Gerardo 
(2007, table 94) 
eq
n p  
(farm-gate) 
Price paid to U.S. growers or 
shippers by retailer and assumed 
price paid to Mexican grower-
shipper by retailer in the pre-
COOL scenario 
12-month average FOB shipping 
point price (2006) for field-
grown tomatoes (excludes 







See Lucier and Gerardo 




Pre and Post- COOL Market Equilibria 
 
In the pre-COOL setting, the equilibrium price for nonlabeled tomatoes (both U.S. and Mexican tomatoes 
combined) can be calculated by setting the nonlabeled demand [taken from text equation (1)] and retail 
supply [taken from text equation (10)] functions equal to each other, 
(A1) 
01 0 1 () ( ) / / n n n n num num pp       
and solving for the retail equilibrium price: 
(A2) 
010 1 1 1 () ( ) . /
eq
n num n n num num n p         
The equilibrium price equation is then substituted into the inverse supply function [text equation (10)], 
(A3) 
010 1 1 1 0 1 () ( ) , / num n n num num n num num n q          
in order to generate the pre-COOL retail equilibrium quantity, 
(A4) 
00 1 1 () () . /
eq
n n num num n q        
  The retail-level market equilibrium price less the marketing margin represents the price paid to both U.S. 
and Mexican farmers at the pre-COOL market equilibrium. The relative equilibrium quantities of U.S. and  
Mexican production, and ,
eq eq
nu nm qq together constituting the total equilibrium amount, can be derived by enter-
ing the equilibrium retail price, ,
eq
n p
 amount paid to farmers plus the marketing margin, into the respective 
supply equations. The following expression illustrates the insertion of the retail price equilibrium equation 
into the pre-COOL Mexican supply equation: 
(A5)   
01 0 1 0 1 1101 () ( ) () . // / nm n num num num n n num num n num num qp                   
Simplification results in the following pre-COOL Mexican equilibrium quantity: 
(A6) 
01 0 1 0 1 10 1 1 1 () ( ) . /
eq
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The same process can be carried out to determine the pre-COOL U.S. equilibrium quantity: 
(A7) 
01 0 1 0 1 10 1 1 1 () ( ) . /
eq
nu num n n num nm n num nu num n nu q                   
  In the post-COOL setting, market-clearing quantities are determined by simultaneously solving the segre-
gated marginal cost and demand functions. In order to determine the market-clearing quantity for U.S. 
tomatoes,  ,
eq
lu q first equate the post-COOL inverse Mexican supply and demand functions, and solve for qlm: 
(A8) 
01 0 1 1 () ( ) . / lm n lu lu lm lm lm qq         
Similarly, equate the post-COOL inverse U.S. supply and demand functions, and solve for qlm: 
(A9) 
01 01 1 1 () ( ) . / lm n lu lu lu lu lu lm lm qq q           
Equating these two equations and solving for qlu generates the following market equilibrium quantity for U.S. 
tomatoes: 
(A10) 
01 01 01 01 0 1 01





lu lm n lu lu lm n lm lm lu n lm lu
lu lu lm lu lm lu lm lm lu
q            
             
 
  The same process (first solving for qlu and then for qlm) allows us to determine the equation for the equi-
librium quantity of Mexican tomatoes: 
(A11) 
01 01 0 1 01





lm lu lm lu n lu lu lu lm
lu lu lm lu lm lu lm lm lu
q       
             
 
  The post-COOL equilibrium retail-level prices are derived by substituting the relevant equilibrium quanti-
ties into the following U.S. and Mexican inverse demand functions: 
(A12) 
01 1 , lm n lu lu lm lm pq q     
(A13) 
01 1. lu n lu lm lu lu pq q     
The post-COOL U.S. and Mexican market equilibria prices less the marketing margin and costs of labeling 
represent the price paid to U.S. and Mexican farmers, respectively. 
 